01
The governance problem
AI activity often spans applications, models and organisational boundaries. When a consequential decision needs review, its account may be scattered across logs, documents and separate systems. A useful review needs the recorded context, relevant versions, the source of each assertion and the evidence available to examine it. Orvessian brings selected structured activity and portable evidence into one workflow. The organisation remains responsible for choosing what to record and operating the controls governing the activity.
02
What the platform records
An integration submits selected structured events within an authorised project: decisions, outcomes, policy references or control observations. Source conversations, documents, media and raw tool inputs and outputs remain in customer systems. Submitted metadata can still contain sensitive information. The credential submitting an event, the source named in its content and the service signing a checkpoint are distinct identities. A service signature does not automatically authenticate the original agent or model. Claimed event time, server-observed time and independently attested time are likewise different observations.
03
Durable acceptance
PostgreSQL is the authoritative acceptance boundary. The transaction stores the event, its immutable minimal commitment, pending evidence work and usage together. A successful response follows commit. Clients retain stable event identities: identical replay returns the existing acceptance without another usage charge; conflicting content under the same scoped identity is rejected. Acceptance is separate from inclusion, signing and timestamping. Durability under infrastructure failure depends on the database and recovery configuration; a transaction is not an unconditional zero-loss promise.
04
Commitments and record versions
A commitment binds the accepted record to a compact cryptographic value using versioned deterministic encoding, domain separation and a private random salt. The encoding defines exactly which bytes are committed. A separate submission digest supports replay detection without changing server observations. Salts help protect predictable values from guessing attacks; they do not make all metadata anonymous. A correction creates a new linked record rather than silently replacing the original statement.
05
Ordered evidence history
Accepted commitments enter an ordered Merkle log. An inclusion proof connects a commitment to a particular tree size and root. A consistency proof checks whether a later tree extends the earlier tree being compared. The design uses the ordered Merkle constructions described in RFC 9162; it does not implement the complete certificate transparency protocol. Log identity, generation and encoding remain explicit. Privileged operators can alter local storage; detecting that alteration requires comparison with trusted evidence retained beyond the altered state. Inclusion cannot establish that every relevant real-world event was submitted.
06
Signed checkpoints
A checkpoint identifies a state of the log, including identity, generation, size and root. The design uses Ed25519 signatures. A verifier checks the complete statement against an accepted key and signing policy. Its creation-time field is a signer assertion, not an independent timestamp. A bundled key is not trustworthy simply because it verifies a bundled signature. Rotation and compromise procedures preserve historical interpretation. Algorithm agility is part of the design; deployed post-quantum protection is not claimed.
07
Independent timestamps
A timestamp authority signs evidence associated with a digest of the complete checkpoint statement, following the RFC 3161 request-and-token model. A validated token supports existence by an attested time, subject to authority policy, accuracy and trust. It does not establish when the reported agent action occurred. Verification checks the checkpoint binding and applicable certificate, signature and trust-policy requirements. Authority outages leave timestamp work pending or retrying; they do not retroactively invalidate an accepted event. Timestamp availability is reported separately.
08
External checkpoint retention
Copies held outside the application administrator’s control provide another reference for checking history. Comparing a restored or later log against a retained checkpoint can expose rollback or inconsistency. An external timestamp alone does not establish that everyone received the same history. Independent custody and comparison are separate controls. Authenticated backups support recovery but should not be represented as an independent witness. The verification policy must identify which independently retained evidence is actually available.
09
Portable verification
An authorised export contains the available record material, commitment, log position, inclusion proof, signed checkpoint and applicable timestamp material. The verifier supplies a separately trusted policy, including accepted keys and authority roots. Payload match, inclusion, signature, consistency and timestamp results remain distinct. A missing payload cannot become a successful payload comparison. Offline verification does not contact Orvessian; any requirement for fresh external information must be satisfied by supplied evidence or reported as unresolved.
10
Retention and recovery
Payloads, private openings, commitments, checkpoints and backups have different retention purposes. After payload expiry, a retained proof may establish commitment inclusion but cannot reconstruct missing content or demonstrate a payload match without the required opening. Free retains live receipt-body detail for 30 days, not every related item or backup. Recovery preserves identities and reconciles pending work before writers resume. Where independent checkpoints exist, compare restored history against them. Never conceal rollback by publishing a smaller or divergent tree under the existing identity.
11
A worked review
An agent recommends a supplier while reporting an expired insurance document. The customer application submits a structured event with the recommendation, document reference, policy reference and reported outcome. Orvessian accepts the event, creates its commitment and subsequently includes it in a signed history. An authorised reviewer exports the record and proof material to check integrity, inclusion and any available timestamp. Those checks do not establish document authenticity or whether the agent inspected it correctly. A replacement document produces a new linked assessment; the earlier exception remains part of the account.
12
Availability and assurance boundaries
Public Free signup provides an initial integration and review workflow. Each record reports acceptance and evidence progress separately. Timestamping and independently retained checkpoint evidence must be assessed from the material actually available, not inferred from signup or acceptance. Source authenticity, capture completeness, operational safety, legal compliance and outcome quality require their own controls. Paid plans and expanded governance workflows are separate product releases.