A shared history for autonomous work.

Autonomous work is useful precisely because it crosses systems without asking a person to inspect every step. But when a consequential result needs review, the relevant history is often scattered across application logs, private documents, access systems and hand-offs. Orvessian is exploring a portable verification receipt that lets a reviewer ask narrower, useful questions: what was recorded, which bytes were considered, who signed, which permission applied, and whether an anchor can be checked.

The central design rule is to keep assurance dimensions separate. A matching commitment supports evidence integrity. A recovered signature supports a statement by a key. An authority check has its own reference point. A policy proof has its own statement. Human appraisal remains a human judgement. The system should be able to return unknown, unsupported, expired or unavailable instead of flattening them into a green badge.

The implemented general format is 0.4.0-alpha. It carries a pinned profile, chain and anchor destination, issuer and subject identifiers, an event, one to thirty-two evidence commitments and optional links. Machine profiles can also carry clock, uncertainty, session and sequence information. Exact evidence bytes are committed outside the chain; salts, evidence locations and private material stay with the appropriate custodian.

A receipt envelope deliberately does not decide what a supplier file, an agent run or a machine event means. Profiles define the evidence roles and assurance language. The current source includes agent, robotics, commerce, content, supply-chain and generic profiles. The agent profile binds inputs, outputs, configuration and policy context; it does not prove inference correctness, authorisation or complete tool-call history. The robotics profile is an audit trail, not a real-time safety controller.

A receipt may be individually anchored, or included in a retained batch manifest whose root is anchored. Verification checks must be performed separately: profile and definition bytes, evidence opening, signature, destination, canonical transaction and block, emitted anchor event, and individual or batch membership. A batch submitter is not automatically the receipt signer; a matching hash does not establish the semantics of the underlying evidence.

The alpha ZK-001 path uses RISC Zero to prove deterministic evaluation of a committed action against a committed policy and configuration. The integrated internal alpha recorded a real proof, a pinned verifier path, a bounded ingress and batch flow, durable index recovery and lookup. That evidence does not establish AI execution, model-output truth, real-world outcomes or production security. General verification receipts do not automatically inherit authorised AVR or ZK-001 semantics.

Base is the accepted launch direction, with live synthetic batches on Base Sepolia. Orvessian runs an application on Base, not its own L1 or separate L2. A private database holds bounded structured governance records and evidence openings; a separate gas wallet publishes commitments. The authenticated portal connects reporting and investigations to signed receipts and checked anchors. Historical consensus and mining experiments are outside the launch critical path.

The supervised synthetic worker and private API have passed bounded recovery checks; a 24-hour reliability run is in progress. Release work includes measured capacity, independent developer trials, stable SDK packaging, source authentication, production identity, storage and key operations, environment separation, encrypted backups and commercial readiness. Configurable governance rules and alert delivery remain future product increments. Testnet confirmations are not production assurance or Ethereum finality.